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 Abstract 
 
In the past year the ‘war against terror’ and perceptions of state failure 
within the post-colonial Pacific have sparked an Australian-led initiative to 
deepen and widen regional integration in Oceania. This paper argues that 
behind the seeming unanimity of the 2004 Auckland Declaration and 
agreement by Pacific Islands Forum leaders on a ‘Pacific vision’ and a 
‘Pacific plan’ are several contending visions of regional community, and of 
community-building. The political and moral legitimacy of each vision 
depends significantly on how these visions answer the question of who is 
Oceania for, and who has the right to speak for it? The seemingly dominant 
vision (that of the Australian government) is problematic in this regard. Past 
practice of Pacific region-building suggests that it may therefore not receive 
the legitimacy it requires for sustainability. This therefore is in danger of 
producing an unintended consequence: the replication at a regional level of 
the legitimacy problem associated with the so-called failing state. 
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Whose Oceania? Contending visions of 
community in Pacific region-building 
GREG FRY1
A loss of faith in the post-colonial state—now often seen as non-viable, 
failed or failing—has encouraged many influential governments and com-
mentators to shift their quest for answers to the question ‘what now for 
good governance in the Pacific?’ to the regional level. Although the basic 
thrust of outside assistance and the commitment of island governments still 
remains focused on rebuilding or sustaining the centralised state, increas-
ingly ‘good governance’ is viewed as only being possible within the context 
of a revitalised and more deeply integrated regional political community. 
The regional level is seen as having the potential to moderate the excesses 
of national governance through establishing obligations to regional norms 
about good governance and economic management. It is also seen as having 
the potential to assist in resolving conflict, to increase the economic 
viability of the smaller states through the pooling of limited resources, and 
to provide a cordon sanitaire against terrorism. 
The new faith in a regional answer to the national governance problem 
has been reflected in a spate of high profile proposals concerned with 
redefining the regional political community of Oceania in significant 
ways. One proposal, emanating from an Australian Senate Committee,2 
but also put forward in various forms by some Australian journalists and 
1  Director of Studies, Graduate Studies in International Affairs, and Hedley Bull Fellow, Department 
of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National 
University. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at Redefining the Pacific: Regionalism—
Past, Present, and Future, 39th University of Otago Foreign Policy School, Dunedin, 25–28 June 
2004. 
2  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, A Pacific engaged: Australia’s 
relations with Papua New Guinea and the island states of the south-west Pacific (Canberra: Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, August 2003), chapters 1 and 3; Senator Peter 
Cook, ‘Address to the ANU Pacific Younger Scholars Week’, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 4 February 2004. 
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academics,3 is for a Pacific political and economic community. In the 
public commentary this proposal has conjured up ideas of a European 
Union-style regional community for the Pacific and is referred to by some 
journalists as a proposal for Pacific Union. 
A second kind of proposal for change has been promoted by the Howard 
government as part of its new hands-on policy approach to the Pacific since 
mid-2003. This approach involves not only a commitment to what Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer refers to as ‘cooperative intervention’ in 
Solomon Islands, and to the insertion of in-line managers and police in 
Papua New Guinea and Nauru; but also a commitment to a more effective 
regional approach led by Australia. Its vision is of a revitalised Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF—managed by an Australian) with greater powers to 
intervene in state sovereignty and to impose obligations on member states to 
conform to regional norms and positions. This new commitment to a more 
effective regional effort is explicitly motivated by a security imperative—
the war against terror—and has to be seen as part of the Howard govern-
ment’s new doctrinal approach to the Pacific underpinned by its view that 
Australia has a ‘special responsibility’ to look after ‘our patch’ defined in 
this context as the Pacific islands region. 
A third proposal was put forward by an Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) 
tasked by the 2003 Forum to review the Pacific Islands Forum.4 This has 
become the most important proposal because it has now been accepted—
in the signing of the Auckland Declaration in April 2004—as the basis of 
future discussions by all Pacific Island Forum member countries including 
Australia and New Zealand.5 Like the Australian proposal it does not seek 
3  Donald Denoon, ‘Australasia: From a conceptual past to a conceivable future’, in N. N. Vohra, ed., 
India and Australasia: History, culture and society (New Delhi: Shipra Publications and India 
International Centre, 2004); Graeme Dobell, ‘The South Pacific: Policy taboos, popular amnesia and 
political failure’, Menzies Research Centre, Australian Security in the 21st Century Seminar Series, 
Parliament House, Canberra, 12 February 2003, <www.exkiap.net/articles/miscellaneous/-
20030212_southpacificlecture.pdf>. 
4  The Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG), ‘Pacific cooperation: Voices of the region: The Eminent 
Persons’ Group review of the Pacific Islands Forum’, April 2004, <www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/-
regions/pacific/pif03/pdf/PIF%20Report.pdf>. 
5  ‘The Auckland Declaration’, Signed at Special Leaders’ Retreat, Pacific Islands Forum, Auckland, 
6 April 2004, <www.forumsec.org.fj/docs/Gen_Docs/Auckland_Declaration.pdf>. 
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a Pacific Union but it does propose much deeper regional integration and 
a rethinking of the ‘Pacific way’ to meet new challenges of governance. 
Its motives are less driven by security concerns as by the challenges of 
good governance, peoples’ welfare and concerns with wide participation 
in a regional community. This position seems also to have been held by 
the New Zealand government and commentators who did not embrace 
either the more radical forms of Australia-centric community of the 
Senate Committee or the ‘war against terror’ arguments underpinning 
Canberra’s position. As chair of the Forum, New Zealand Prime Minister 
Helen Clarke made it clear that she wanted a more pro-active Secretary 
General in a crisis and radical restructuring if the Pacific is not to become 
‘a ghetto of conflict and poverty’.6
These three proposals have become confused in the public commentary. 
There has been a tendency to represent the various Australian proposals, and 
even the New Zealand Prime Minister’s position prior to the Forum, as one 
of supporting a move towards a Pacific Community modelled on the 
European Community.7 The Australian government has denied this. After 
the Auckland Forum, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard was 
reported as saying that: ‘talk of a Pacific Union was premature: “It’s 
counter-productive and it achieves nothing to be talking in those sort of 
grandiose terms … Let us crawl before we walk”’.8 And the Eminent 
Persons’ Group report made it clear that although it was not ruling out such 
a Pacific Union as a long-term goal, the immediate concerns were making 
the Pacific Islands Forum more effective. There is clearly no intention at 
this stage on the part of Australia, New Zealand or Pacific Island 
governments to move to a Political and Economic Community modelled on 
the European Community. 
While the signing of the Auckland Declaration at one level suggests a 
settlement on the question of what form the redefinition of the Pacific will 
6  ‘The United States of the Pacific’, editorial, Sydney Morning Herald, 17 March 2004, p. 12. 
7  See, for example, Helen Tunnah, ‘Pacific plan hints at Economic Union’, New Zealand Herald, 
7 April 2004; ‘The United States of the Pacific’; ‘Be open minded on Pacific Union’, editorial, 
Papua New Guinea Post Courier, 11 March 2004. 
8  ‘Leaders hail new era of Pacific unity’, The Australian, 7 April 2004. 
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take, it remains an important exercise in my view to explore the 
implications of all three proposals mentioned above. The Australian 
government is obviously a key player in region-building and in its present 
mood sees itself as having the ‘responsibility’ to manage things in ‘our 
patch’. The flesh has yet to be put on the bones of the Pacific plan 
recommended by the Eminent Persons’ Group, a process in which the 
Australian position will be influential. There are also some who see the 
EPG report as already satisfying the key objectives of the Australian push 
for regional reform9 suggesting the need to examine the differences 
between the two. The more radical proposal of the bipartisan Senate 
Committee reflects a broader canvassing of Australian opinion and could 
become the basis of a Labor government’s approach to region-building. 
Stripped of its controversial ‘one regional currency’ (the Australian dollar) 
and ‘one regional labour market’ arguments the Senate Committee’s 
proposed Pacific community is not that much different from where the 
current regional arrangements are heading in the Forum, even without the 
EPG review. 
THE LEGITIMACY QUESTION 
The particular concern of this paper is the question of the moral and 
political legitimacy of contending visions of community contained in these 
region-building proposals. The legitimacy of the post-colonial state is the 
key issue at the national level of governance in the Pacific,10 it should also 
be seen as central when regional forms of governance are being defined or 
redefined. Lacking the coercive and socialising powers of the state, the 
regional political community is even more dependent on legitimacy as the 
basis of its political and moral authority. ‘Legitimacy’ takes us not only to 
questions of justice (whether a particular form of region-building is seen as 
denying the rights of particular groups for example) but also to questions of 
sustainability and order (whether a proposed form of region-building is 
likely to gain political acceptance by those affected by it). By legitimacy, 
then, I am not referring to the legal authority of the soft law associated with 
  9  Mark Metherell, ‘Pacific nations agree to closer ties’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 April 2004. 
10  I examine this issue in ‘Political legitimacy and the post-colonial state: Reflections on some 
common threads in the Fiji and Solomon Islands coups’, Pacifica Review 12(3) October 2000, pp. 
295–304. 
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declarations and treaties (or indeed of hard law if a more radical form of 
integrated community were formed) or the legal authority of the founding 
processes engaged in by sovereign states but rather the acceptance and 
recognition of the moral and political authority of the regional political 
community by the people who are subject to it. 
The 35 years of region-building in the post-colonial Pacific and the 25 
years of the late colonial period before it, suggests what questions we 
should focus on to judge the political and moral legitimacy of proposals for 
future Oceanic community. From this experience I contend that the legiti-
macy question turns on what and who is excluded (and included), and on 
what grounds, in a particular conception of community. The first is what 
does it stand for as a set of values, practices and ideas? At stake here is the 
key issue of how should Pacific islanders live their lives? For example, how 
should they be organised economically? What constitutes a secure 
community? What should their relationship be to the land? What should the 
moral obligation be to other Pacific islanders living under colonialism or 
repression? The second question is, who should be regarded as belonging to 
the community and on what basis? And third, who can speak for it and 
determine its practices? 
Ultimately the answers to the first and second questions are derived from 
the answer to the third—who controls the idea of Oceania and claims to 
speak for it? I therefore propose to focus on this question in exploring the 
legitimacy question in relation to the current attempts to redefine regional 
community. In the post-colonial Pacific context this question is very 
pertinent. It has been at the centre of the struggle over the legitimacy of 
various forms of Pacific community for over 60 years. It has centred on a 
debate about the self-determination of Pacific societies and its flipside, a 
debate about hegemonic regionalism (whether seen as colonial or neo-
colonial) concerning the role of colonial powers, ex-colonial powers and 
other outside forces, but particularly of Australia, in defining what the 
Pacific should stand for as an idea. As importantly, it has also involved a 
debate among Pacific islanders about who represents the ‘self’ in regional 
self-determination. The rights of state elites to be the only group to speak 
for the regional community has been challenged over several decades by 
non-governmental organisations, sovereignty movements, the leaders of 
dependent territories, and women’s groups. 
6  GREG FRY 
 
 
LEGITIMACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
The establishment of the South Pacific Forum in 1971 was the most 
sophisticated institutional expression of a post-colonial vision of regional 
community built on self-determination principles.11 The Pacific leaders 
were strongly supported in this new effort at region-building by New 
Zealand, and with slightly less enthusiasm, by Australia. To underscore the 
self-determination principle, it was not enough that the Forum overcome the 
constraints on political discussions in the South Pacific Commission, or that 
it be structured in such a way that there was equality among members; it 
was also regarded as essential that only sovereign island states, and 
Australia and New Zealand, be allowed to participate, thus excluding the 
dependent territories and the other metropolitan powers, France, Britain and 
the United States. 
Although the basis of the claimed legitimacy of the new regionalism was 
the entrenchment of this self-determination principle, this by no means 
resolved the contest over the question who is the regional community for? 
And who speaks for it? In the subsequent three decades there have been 
many challenges to this interpretation of regional self-determination and 
therefore to the legitimacy of this vision of regional governance. 
One set of challenges has come from within the Island Pacific over the 
question of whether the definition of ‘self’ in self-determination is inclusive 
enough. The emergence of this dominant vision of regional community in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s was accompanied by the promotion of a 
‘Pacific way’ ideology among Pacific leaders. This was soon challenged by 
other Pacific islanders as being an exclusivist vision of Pacific cultural 
identity and as acting to entrench male chiefly rule. It was also seen as 
excluding the largest ethnic group in the Pacific at that time, the Indo-
Fijians. Challenges also came from sovereignty and independence move-
ments in Hawaii, New Caledonia and West Papua, and from the leaders of 
dependent territories such as French Polynesia, for not being recognised as 
having a right to participate in the determination of what the regional 
community should come to represent. 
11  See Greg Fry, ‘International cooperation in the South Pacific: From regional integration to collective 
diplomacy’, in W. Andrew Axline, ed., The political economy of regional cooperation (London: 
Pinter Press, 1994). 
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Another set of challenges has come from the non-government sector. 
They challenge the state-centrism of Pacific regionalism. They have pre-
ferred a vision of community that embraces representatives of society as 
well as of the state. They also have a different vision of what the Pacific 
community should stand for in relation to key issues such as economic 
development, environmental protection, and security. Moreover they see a 
different regional boundary that incorporates West Papua and perhaps New 
Zealand. A particular challenge from the non-government sector has come 
from women’s groups who have criticised the male domination of regional 
decision making. This was graphically demonstrated at the 1980 South 
Pacific Conference in Port Moresby when a large group of women staged a 
demonstration outside the conference and waved placards saying, in effect, 
‘where are the women?’12
Another focal point for contests over self-determination affecting the 
legitimacy of the existing regional vision as expressed in the Forum model 
has come from the intermittent attempt by the Australian government to 
reinterpret the original Forum vision to one in which there is a hierarchy in 
the community membership with Australia, and sometimes New Zealand, 
seen as first class citizens and having to exercise a ‘special responsibility’ to 
manage or lead the Forum agenda and to sometimes move outside the 
Forum to determine what the region stands for. This impetus was parti-
cularly evident from 1976 to 1980, and in 1984–88, as a result of Australia’s 
Cold War concerns, and again in 1994–96 around the effort of the Keating 
government to impose a World Bank model of development on the region. 
It has been evident again since 2002 to the present day in relation to an 
attempt by the Howard government to create a ‘Pacific solution’ to its 
asylum seeker problem and a regional security order around issues of anti-
terrorism. 
These attempts to redefine the relationship between the state members of 
the regional community created problems for the legitimacy of the 
redefinitions of the Pacific imposed by Canberra, a point recognised by 
Gareth Evans’ doctrine of ‘constructive commitment’ in 1989, after a 
decade in which the legitimacy of an Australian-imposed idea of a regional 
12  Personal observations at South Pacific Conference, Port Moresby, 1980. 
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security community came under strong challenge from the island states. 
These attempts to impose a regional order have also been seen as even less 
legitimate when Australia is seen as representing the ideas and models of 
community of foreign powers or global agencies, as in the attempt to 
impose a World Bank view of land ownership in 1994 and, more recently, 
of responding to Australia’s domestic politics rather than to the communal 
needs established through Pacific dialogue, or of operating on behalf of the 
United States in some kind of deputy sheriff role. 
Epeli Hau’ofa has put forward a powerful critique of official region-
building by a coalition of outsiders, island elites, consultants and academics 
as ultimately representing hegemonic views that are belittling for Pacific 
islanders. He puts forward a seemingly romantic notion of a self-
determining Oceanic community against the stilted instrumentalism of the 
elite concept going under the label ‘Pacific islands region’: 
Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding, Oceania is hospitable and generous, 
Oceania is humanity rising from the depths of brine and regions of fire deeper 
still, Oceania is us. We are the sea, we are the ocean, we must wake up to this 
ancient truth and together use it to overturn all hegemonic views that aim 
ultimately to confine us again, physically and psychologically, in the tiny 
spaces that we have resisted accepting as our sole appointed places, and from 
which we have recently liberated ourselves. We must not allow anyone to 
belittle us again, and take away our freedom.13
As the region considers the new proposals for redefining future Oceanic 
community we must keep in mind that there is already a form of regional 
political community in existence and it reflects, as we have seen, the 
dominance of a state-centric answer to the question ‘who can speak for the 
region?’ and one, in particular, where Australia seeks a hegemonic role in 
agenda-setting. The legitimacy of this community has been challenged 
because some groups feel unrepresented or feel that the self-determination 
principle needs widening or reinforcing. The challenge also stems from the 
fact that this perceived exclusion also leads to the exclusion of different 
answers to the question: what should the regional community stand for as a 
set of ideas and practices? Regional non-governmental organisations, 
13  Epeli Hau’ofa, ‘Our sea of islands’, The Contemporary Pacific 6(1) Spring 1994, pp. 148–61, at 
p. 160. 
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church groups, women’s groups and environmental groups have generally 
argued that the answer given by the inner circle of those speaking for the 
regional community has privileged neoliberal orthodoxies in relation to the 
conceptualisation of development, and thus has become an agent of 
globalisation. They also argue that the notion of regional security as defined 
by this inner group reflects Australian views on behalf of larger powers. But 
even within the state grouping, the Australian dominance of the agenda is 
often viewed as skewing the response to the question of what the region 
should stand for. The regional stance on climate change is an extreme 
example of this but there are many others. 
We are now in a position to turn to a consideration of how current 
proposals to redefine Oceanic regionalism, and the visions of community 
they contain, may enter this longstanding contest over self-determination 
and what the region should stand for, and the implications of this in turn for 
the legitimacy of this latest attempt at region-building. I consider three 
models of regional community in particular: that contained in the Australian 
government’s proposal, put forward since August 2003, to strengthen the 
Pacific Islands Forum as part of its responsibilities within the ‘war against 
terror’; the more radical Australian proposals for Pacific Economic Union 
put forward by a Senate Committee, academics and journalists in late 2003; 
and the vision of future community implied in the report of the Eminent 
Persons’ Group of the Pacific Islands Forum in April 2004. 
THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL 
The Australian government vision of Pacific community is for a state-
centric community of Pacific island states managed by, but not including, 
Australia. The community should embrace good governance, democracy 
and neoliberal economic values and harmonise laws around border control 
in a way that would suit Australia’s security concerns. It calls for greater 
regional integration in the form of pooling of resources among Pacific 
island states in such areas as police training and civil aviation. This amounts 
to a return to the 1970s call for regional integration in the area of economic 
development and to the 1980s call for regional security defined in ways that 
were seen as promoting Australian security. It also seeks a community of 
states in which the obligations entered into by the island member states are 
more binding on national governments. This is consistent with Australia’s 
concern to achieve more effective implementation of the Australian-led 
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regional agenda of the past few years on security and governance (which 
already has agreement on paper).  
The vision of community can then be seen as an extension of the vision 
implicit in the declarations of the existing Forum. The community should 
stand for ‘good governance’ and ‘development’ as defined by the World 
Bank, but there should be a return to regional integration to promote this. 
The processes of regional community should be changed to give effect to 
the achievement of existing goals, particularly in relation to economic 
development and securing the regional borders. Australia and New Zealand 
are seen as patrons, and not participants, in such a community. Australia 
nevertheless has a special responsibility to determine the nature of this 
regional community for those within it. This responsibility is to the 
international community, and particularly the United States. 
This new commitment to region-building is driven by a perceived 
security imperative associated with the ‘war against terror’. It has to be seen 
in the context of Prime Minister Howard’s attempt to minimise the 
Australian commitment of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq since the fall of 
Baghdad while still appearing as a committed alliance partner with the 
United States. It was also part of a conceptual shift in policy thinking 
exemplified in two key reports issued by the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute (ASPI) that argue that the region is now to be seen as a set of failed 
or failing states whose failure could invite terrorist havens that would 
threaten Australian security interests.14
The change in Australia’s Pacific policy, again paralleling a paradigm 
shift suggested by ASPI, has been dramatic. The most significant expression 
of this change in approach concerned the decision to reverse a longstanding 
and considered policy of non-intervention in Solomon Islands. But also of 
importance was the Australian government’s decision in December 2003 to 
radically change the way it engages with Papua New Guinea. The 
‘enhanced cooperation package’, or ECP, is a hands-on approach aimed at 
bolstering law and order and ‘good governance’. It involves the direct 
14  Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Beyond Bali: ASPI’s strategic assessment 2002 (Canberra: 
ASPI, 2002); Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Our failing neighbour (Canberra: ASPI, June 
2003). 
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insertion of 250 Australian police and a number of government officials in 
in-line positions. A third expression of this new doctrine can be seen in the 
change in Australia’s approach to Nauru in 2004. Australia has insisted on 
placing its officers in key financial management and police positions in the 
Nauru government as the condition of receiving further assistance for the 
bankrupt Nauru economy. 
The new commitment to redefining Pacific regionalism has to be seen in 
the light of this new hands-on engagement. In the context of developing the 
rationale for the Solomon Islands intervention, Howard promoted the idea 
of the pooling of regional resources as a means of small non-viable states 
finding the resources to govern and to avert the longer term economic 
problems producing state failure. He called specifically for regional 
integration in civil aviation and police training. Consistent with the hands-
on approach at the centre of the new doctrine, Australia has also pushed to 
have an Australian in charge of the reform process, overthrowing a 30-year 
convention of a Pacific islander being at the helm of the Pacific Islands 
Forum. While it is not new for Australia to use regionalism as a vehicle for 
promoting good governance and ‘war against terror’ objectives, what 
changed in 2003–04 was the degree of hands-on engagement, not least in 
the personal involvement of the Australian Prime Minister. Nor was the 
push for an Australian as Secretary-General a trivial matter, given the 
symbolism that this position holds in representing the efforts of a past 
generation of Pacific islanders to decolonise South Pacific regionalism. 
The most important aspect of the new push for region-building from 
Canberra is the return of a very old Australian discourse in relation to the 
South Pacific, that of ‘special responsibility’. This idea—that Australia has a 
special responsibility to manage things in the Pacific islands region, a 
responsibility that is expected of it by distant and powerful friends—is a 
recurring theme in Howard’s explanation for the new hands-on approach to 
the Pacific since mid-2003. This self-image as leader and manager 
recaptures the policy atmosphere of the 1980s and of 1994–96 when this 
idea last surfaced. It of course raises issues of self-determination for Pacific 
states and peoples particularly as the Howard government has made no 
secret of the fact that it is exercising this responsibility on behalf of the 
Coalition in this part of the world in lieu of heavier deployments to the 
Middle East. 
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THE PACIFIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMUNITY PROPOSAL 
At about the same time as Mr Howard was announcing his government’s 
commitment to a strengthened Pacific regionalism through a pooling of 
resources, a very different model of Oceanic political community emerged 
as the main recommendation of A Pacific engaged, a report by the 
bipartisan Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References 
Committee. This is a proposal for a Pacific political and economic 
community (PPEC). The proposal is for a highly integrated economic 
community including a free trade area, monetary union (preferably using 
the Australian dollar) and free labour movement into Australia (although it 
recommends only a limited pilot scheme in the first instance) and a high 
degree of obligation for island countries to engage in sound economic 
management. Although ‘political community’ is also implied in the naming 
of this proposal it is clearly focused on the economic. There is no mention 
of a regional parliament, regional confederation or other form of political 
integration such as joint foreign policy.15
In contrast to the security-driven Australian government proposal, the 
rationale underlying the Senate Committee proposal is primarily a human-
itarian one.16 The objectives are sustainable economic growth, democratic 
and ethical governance, ‘shared and balanced’ defence and security, and 
better health, welfare and education. The beliefs driving the proposal are 
that ‘economic and social problems are worsening’ in the island states; that 
Australia has a responsibility to assist; and that the best policy approach for 
Australia to achieve this is to promote or at least study the idea of a fully 
integrated Pacific economic union. How is a Pacific community to achieve 
these goals? An enormous weight is put on ‘sustainable regional economic 
growth’. If such growth is achieved, it is argued, ‘issues of governance, 
international crime, law and order, regional security and the health and well-
being of the people will improve’.17
15  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, A Pacific engaged, chapters 1, 3; 
Cook, ‘Address to the ANU Pacific Younger Scholars Week’. 
16  A Pacific engaged, pp. 7–10. 
17  Ibid., pp. 7–8. 
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An equally large burden is put on the answer to the question: how might 
the Pacific political and economic community achieve this ‘sustainable 
regional economic growth’? The explicit answer given is through pooling of 
resources and the imposing of disciplines in economic management on 
national governments. Mike Moore, former Director-General of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), is cited with approval, for example, in 
observing that: 
Studies show that countries preparing for entry to the EU and WTO do better 
than those without such objectives. The economic discipline brings with it 
growth, social progress and better governance.18
The Senate Committee’s proposal was clearly influenced by, but further 
developed the ideas of some key Australian academics and journalists. 
Donald Denoon, Professor of Pacific History at the Australian National 
University, for example, argues: 
The only way that our region can become more prosperous and harmonious is 
to revisit and revive the substance (though not the name) of Australasia, 
acknowledging that the federal compact of 1900 was too narrow to serve the 
needs of the region. First, we should concede that there is a region and mutual 
responsibilities within it. What should follow is the creation of a free trade 
area. Equally necessary is an integrated defence structure. Ultimately the 
region and its members need something like the European Community, so that 
currency fluctuations are avoided, capital and technology flow freely, and the 
benefits of a larger market can be enjoyed. Anything less is simply delaying 
the collapse of the smaller economies and polities, with catastrophic con-
sequences for Australia and New Zealand.19
And Graeme Dobell, Radio Australia foreign affairs reporter, in an 
influential public lecture delivered at Parliament House in February 2003, 
noted that: 
To match our security guarantee with an economic guarantee, it’s time for 
Canberra to advocate the creation of a Pacific Economic Community 
grouping Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Island states of the 
Forum and possibly the French Pacific territories … Our purpose is to prevent 
18  Ibid., p. 79. 
19  Denoon, ‘Australasia’, p. 13. 
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the disintegration of small societies and fragile states. We need to put a 
regional floor beneath Pacific economies. Australia and New Zealand need a 
broadly-based Pacific Community so that their demands for reform and 
change are not merely dismissed as new forms of colonialism. Labour 
mobility would give Canberra and Wellington fresh bargaining power to 
move the regional game in new directions. … Stronger regional structures are 
needed to give Island states some life support and allow real nation-
building.20
All three proposals—that of Dobell, Denoon and the Senate Committee—
envisage a community in which there are rights and obligations or ‘mutual 
responsibilities’. The Senate Committee makes this the ‘central plank’ of its 
PPEC. It argues that if Australia has an obligation to the region (which the 
report assumes), and the region has a right to expect Australia to play its role 
(again assumed), then the region has an obligation to Australia to work 
towards economic reform and efficiency. The same logic appears to be 
admired by Dobell in his reference to the success of the EC in getting the 
Pacific to do what it wants: 
Australia should be shamed that the European Union was able to force the 
Forum Island countries to create an Islands-only free trade grouping. Rattling 
its aid money, the European Commission demanded the creation of a 
matching trans-national body so it could more easily conduct its business 
through the Forum Secretariat in Suva. The EU Aid Commissioner toured the 
region last October telling the Islands that small is not beautiful, small is 
ridiculous in economic terms. If the EU can move the Pacific to embrace an 
economic concept that delivers little real benefit to the Islands (and one 
they’ve resisted for 30 years) then Australia and New Zealand should become 
bolder about creating a regional community that could actually do some 
good.21
The problem is that this sounds more like imposing aid conditionality 
rather than forming the basis of a sustainable social contract for building a 
community. Under this suggestion, Australia determines who has 
responsibility to whom and does so on the basis of ‘rattling its aid money’, 
to use Dobell’s phrase, or offering some labour access. All three proposals 
are highly Australia-centric. They see an Australian hub with a series of 
20  Dobell, ‘The South Pacific’, pp. 21–2. 
21  Ibid., p. 21. 
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spokes rather than a regional community in which Australia happens to be 
the biggest member. In this respect the community is to be built for Pacific 
island societies but on Australian terms. 
Nevertheless, these three proposals appear more able to gain legitimacy 
than the Howard government’s vision, because the primary motivation is at 
least to assist the Pacific rather than secure Australia. There is also at least 
some opening up of Australia into the community. Furthermore in the case 
of Dobell and the Senate Committee, the proposals are put forward in the 
context of making the case for more people-to-people contacts between the 
Pacific and Australia, and for education of Australians on Pacific matters. 
While their regional community concept is still one of a ‘community of 
states’ it crosses a line into a broader notion of community with this link to 
society. 
THE PACIFIC EMINENT PERSONS’ GROUP PROPOSAL 
The third prominent vision of future Pacific community grew out of an 
Australian and New Zealand push for more effective regionalism at the 
Auckland Forum in August 2003. It is important to note that the Australian 
push reflected the Howard government position outlined above, and not that 
of the Senate Committee. A Pacific engaged had been released around the 
same time, and confused reporting of the Australian position at the 
Auckland Forum. As we have seen, the Australian government was 
concerned with tightening up regionalism as part of its responsibility to 
manage ‘our patch’ in the war against terror. Prime Minister Howard went 
to the Auckland Forum with the intention of promoting further pooling of 
resources at the regional level particularly in the area of police training and 
civil aviation as well as a tightening up of the processes and management of 
the Pacific Islands Forum (including the insertion of an Australian in the top 
regional post, running the PIF Secretariat). The position of New Zealand’s 
Prime Minister, Helen Clarke, while obviously not embracing the ideas of 
Australia’s ‘special responsibility’ was also concerned to create a much 
more effective Forum to confront the issues that her government had been 
very active in assisting in recent years: development, law and order, and 
conflict situations. 
In the event, the other Pacific leaders agreed to this agenda. As well as 
support in principle for police training and civil aviation, they agreed to set 
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up an Eminent Persons’ Group to conduct the first comprehensive review of 
the Forum.22 The EPG was chaired by Sir Julius Chan, former Prime 
Minister of Papua New Guinea, and comprised several prominent members: 
Dr Langi Kavaliku of the Kingdom of Tonga, Teburoro Tito, former 
President of Kiribati, Maiava Iulai Toma, the Samoan Ombudsman, and 
Robert Cotton, a former Australian diplomat. It consulted widely in the 
Pacific states at both government and civil society levels. Reflecting the 
perceived urgency to act, particularly as seen by Forum chair, Helen Clarke, 
it reported to a special Forum summit in Auckland in April 2004. What was 
before the leaders was a proposal for future directions and an outline of the 
principles on which a future Pacific ‘community of states’ should be based. 
A vision statement outlined the general concept; its implementation awaited 
the filling out of a Pacific Plan to be developed before the next Forum. The 
April Forum agreed to the EPG report and its vision statement in the 
Auckland Declaration. 
While this EPG proposal grew out of an Australian and New Zealand 
effort to tighten up the Forum’s regional activities, it contains a significantly 
different vision of regional community than that implicit in the Australian 
position in particular (although it may be closer to that of the New Zealand 
government).23 I therefore wish to take a different tack to those who see the 
EPG report as simply a reflection of Australian government interests. The 
Sydney Morning Herald’s Mark Metherell, for example, interpreted the 
acceptance of the EPG report by the Pacific leaders as: 
Pacific leaders have agreed to more integration with Australia in return for 
more help to counter the economic and political disintegration of their 
struggling countries.24
22  Forum Communique, 34th meeting, Auckland, August 2003. 
23  As in the establishment of the Forum itself, New Zealand played an important role in supporting the 
development of the EPG vision and the chair of the EPG singles out the New Zealand Prime 
Minister, observing that ‘The Review was inspired by an insightful presentation right at the start by 
the Chair of the Pacific Islands Forum, the New Zealand Prime Minister, Rt Hon Helen Clarke’. See 
Statement by Rt Hon Sir Julius Chan GCMG, KBE, Chair of the Eminent Persons’ Group, Pacific 
Islands Forum Review, March 2004, <www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/-
pifreviewdocs/chair.html>. 
24  Metherell, ‘Pacific nations agree to closer ties’. 
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The EPG’s conception of regional community has to be seen within the 
parameters of their brief. Their task was to review the Pacific Islands 
Forum. Their starting point was therefore very different from the Australian 
Senate Committee who began with a clean slate and came up with what 
they thought was an ideal regional community rather than beginning with 
what was there already. Their finishing point was also, not surprisingly, 
quite distinct. Nevertheless, while not advocating a highly integrated Pacific 
economic community, the EPG did not rule out such a community in the 
future. It observed that a Pacific economic union was in fact one of the 
earliest goals of the Forum and that it is ‘a vision that remains incomplete, 
though still a relevant objective’.25 Pacific leaders signing onto the vision 
contained in the report also made it clear that the time was not yet ripe for a 
Pacific Union. 
The EPG nevertheless opts for a conception of community that goes 
beyond that implicit in the current Forum activities. First, it envisions a 
community of states engaged in ‘deep integration’ (by implication a higher 
level of integration than currently attempted) and greater cooperation in 
such areas as transport, information technology, quarantine, customs, 
security, judicial and public administration, and regional law enforcement. 
Second, it promotes the idea of a more proactive Secretary-General able to 
act to mobilise the community to assist in times of regional crisis including 
within a member state. This amounts to a gentle push across the line of state 
sovereignty. Third, while seeing the community as a ‘community of states’, 
it nevertheless promotes the participation of dependent territories, civil 
society groups such as women’s groups, youth and churches in regional 
deliberations, and introduces the notion of ‘peoples of the region’. Fourth, it 
seeks to settle the question of the legitimacy of Australian and New Zealand 
membership of the community but also to place a check on any aspirations 
to hegemonic relations between members: 
It is time to put aside suspicions and differences by explicitly recognising that 
we are all—whether from Small Island States or more prosperous Australia 
25  EPG, ‘Pacific cooperation’, p. 27. 
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and New Zealand—peoples of the region. We are political partners and are 
equal members of the Forum.26
In terms of the relationship with the Australian conception of regional 
community, we should particularly note that although the EPG vision shares 
the purposes of security and development in a region, it is concerned to 
introduce Pacific heritage and cultural identity as a guiding principle of 
community. The emphasis on a community of peoples as well as states also 
seems to suggest a departure from the Australian conception that is state-
centric and instrumentalist. The process by which this conception was 
arrived at is also important. The EPG report is justly proud of the wide 
consultation that was involved and describes the resultant recommendations 
accordingly as representing ‘authentic Pacific opinion’. 
CONCLUSION 
Past experience would suggest that the Eminent Persons’ Group vision of 
future Pacific community has the most potential to gain the support of the 
Pacific states and other segments of Pacific society. It reinforces the equal 
place at the table where decisions are made for all states regardless of size, a 
principle which disciplines the larger states as well as seeking to assure the 
smaller states, at the same time as promoting a more inclusive community. 
While still state-centric in its conception of community, it talks about an 
opening up to regional civil society on the one hand and to the dependent 
territories on the other. It also introduces a more balanced list of community 
concerns than the Australian proposals, and introduces protection of cultural 
heritage as an equally important purpose of the regional community. It is a 
vision that has been derived from extensive consultation with all sectors of 
society in all member states, and therefore has the possibility of going some 
of the way to meet the concerns of those who felt excluded in the past. 
In practice there is a danger that this more inclusive vision of the EPG 
will be hijacked by an Australian government intent on promoting its 
‘special responsibility’ to manage the region in the ‘war on terror’. It is of 
course quite acceptable for Australia to have concerns about security and its 
links to development and governance in the post-colonial states in the 
Pacific. The difficulty begins, as in the past, when Australia arrogates to 
26  Statement by Chan. 
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itself the right to determine the agenda and values of the Pacific community 
on behalf of the West, the United States or the international community, or 
just in terms of its own domestic political requirements. This may 
eventually lead to a lack of support among the island state members for the 
Australian-led agenda as it did in the 1980s and 1994–96. And in the 
meantime the adoption of an Australian agenda may alienate the non-state 
actors whose participation is required if there is to be room for a debate on 
the main assumptions of regional community visions about neoliberal 
development as the panacea for conflict resolution, good governance and 
security. 
There is also the problem that the Australian vision does not include 
Australia as part of the regional community, and yet Australia wants to 
determine the values and purposes of that community. While it continues to 
do this, the regional community will lack legitimacy and be quietly 
challenged by those within it. In this regard the Senate Committee report 
and others concerned with a more integrated Pacific Union offer a more 
hopeful vision. They not only place Australia within an integrated region; 
they also recognise the need for people-to-people contact and for the 
education of Australians, if a regional community is to be based on a feeling 
of identity. 
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